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| Safety Recommendation Number: | IRLD2016005 |
| AAIU Event Reference: | IRL00913099 |
| AAIU Report Number: | 2016-007 |
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| Safety Recommendation Status: | Implemented, closed |

Safety Recommendation:

The FAA should conduct a study to establish whether a safety deficiency exists in pitot probe icing protection for aircraft certified under CFR Part 25 prior to 5 January 2015, and address any deficiencies that may be identified.

Response:

June 2017

The FAA responded to the AAIU by letter dated 09 June 2017 advising as follows:

"FAA Comment. Since the 2009 Air France flight 447 accident, the FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency have worked with accident investigation authorities and manufacturers to establish whether a safety deficiency exists in air data probe icing protection for aircraft certified under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 25. In lieu of a study, activities to support the intent of the AAIU's safety recommendation are ongoing and have so far included meteorological research, immediate voluntary changes made by industry, and several-airplane design improvements mandated by multiple airworthiness directives (AD). The review of aircraft in-service data supporting the Air France flight 447 accident investigation found numerous similar air data system icing events. However, unlike Air France flight 447, none of these posed a significant risk. As a consequence of the Air France flight 447 accident investigation and continued operational safety (COS) activities, unreliable airspeed conditions have been re-examined.

Occurrence rates involving air data probe events have decreased significantly and there have been no related accidents. However, there have been a few air data events with safety consequences, including the United Airlines B-757 event triggering this recommendation. As the Irish AAIU and Boeing noted in the final investigative report, dated October 20 2013, only one air data channel was affected during this event. The engine-indicating and crew-alerting system alert and the master caution alert were presented to the crew as designed and covered in flight crew training procedures. However, in this case, the first officer reacted without clearly communicating with the captain, whose instruments were functioning correctly. Other similar air data anomalies have occurred in other Boeing airplanes with the same alerting scheme and training regime, with no adverse safety consequence. The FAA's Aircraft Certification Service continues to review reports of in-service occurrences and follow-up with corrective actions, as necessary, as part of its COS activities."

AAIU Comment:

The AAIU considers the status of this Safety Recommendation as "Implemented,Closed"

